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Abstract 
According to the economic analysis of law, an efficient property regime is premised on the 
universality, the exclusivity, and the transferability of property rights. Ideally then, every 
(legal) person can enjoy the status of an owner and any (economic) resource can become 
private property; ownership titles could be bought and sold across national jurisdictions and 
would ultimately be respected everywhere in the world. Throughout history, property 
regimes indeed seem to have moved towards this ideal. However, this conception of private 
property is far less natural than it seems, and not without problems. Instead, the institution of 
property rights is inherently connected with the development of capitalist society, and it 
reflects the latter’s underlying tensions. The starting point for a sociological account of 
property rights is to conceive them as a social relation, or a relation of power, which includes 
(other) owners and non-owners as well as the state as a ‘third party’. In this chapter, the 
authors build on the work of Karl Polanyi and John R. Commons to suggest that the property 
regime of the market society relies both on the reification of property (identifying it with the 
thing owned) and the commodification of the right of ownership (turning it into a marketable 
commodity). Looking back, the authors retrace how the concept of property changed with the 
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advent of modern capitalism, and how it evolved in the transition from agricultural to 
industrial capitalism. Looking into the future, they also address the challenges of today’s 
informational capitalism, which is characterized by the commodification of knowledge. 
Based on James’s work, the authors introduce the ‘correlative rights doctrine’ as an 
alternative to the remnant ‘property rights absolutism’ in the field of intellectual property 
law, but also beyond. With cross-border conflicts in who owns what having proliferated in 
the global age, investigations into the relational quality of property rights also matter for 
international lawyers, who are confronted with new subjects and objects of property, from 
international investment law to intellectual property law. 
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PREFACE: WHY BOTHER WITH PROPERTY RELATIONS? 
Why should international lawyers be interested in the sociology of property rights? It is 
usually taken for granted that property rights arise from municipal law and that international 
public law plays only a marginal role in regulating them (while international private law 
mediates between different property regimes). The idea that there is an ‘international law of 
property’ may thus first seem to be a contradiction in terms.1 However, this is only the case 
in a classical understanding of international law, which is based on the doctrinal distinction 
between public and private law, national and international law. The conceptual starting point 
can be found in the Westphalian notion of sovereignty, or ‘the axiom that a state has 
sovereignty over its territory’.2 What follows from this is that ‘each state has the right to 
adopt laws governing how private actors utilize that territory’, that is, what forms of property 
they can acquire, with land being the prototypical object of property.3 Control of territory and 
control of property thus have the same ideological roots. In nineteenth-century legal 
positivism, public international law eventually came to be defined in ‘loose analogy to the 
private law of contract’, which means that the relations between sovereign states were 
conceived in similar terms as the relations between private actors – or property owners, for 
that matter.4 In contrast, the natural-law idea of property rights has always had universalist 
underpinnings. According to this line of thinking, property rights exist independent from 
states but rely on states for enforcement. In this sense, ‘the state was created to protect pre-
existing property rights’.5 
The controversy between naturalism and positivism on the origins of property rights and their 
relevance for international law has given way to what one could term a more functionalist 
vision of international relations, which pays heed to the effects of capitalist expansion and 
economic globalization. If there is a universal idea of property rights today, this also reflects 
the coming-into-being of a global society of property owners, whose activities in trade and 
investment are shaped by international economic law. The formal understanding of (public) 
                                                   
1 John G. Sprankling, The International Law of Property (Oxford University Press 2014). 
2 Ibid, at 5. 
3 Ibid. 
4 David Kennedy, ‘International Law in the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion’ (1996) 65 
ActScandJurisGent 385–420, at 398. 
5 Sprankling, International Law of Property (n 1 above), at 6. 
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international law as ‘the law governing relations among states’ is increasingly being 
superseded by a functional understanding of international (economic) law as ‘the law, of 
whatever origin, which governs international economic transactions’.6 Today, international 
law is no longer addressed to states only, and private actors are increasingly regarded as legal 
subjects who can assert their rights without mediation by states. Concomitantly, we can speak 
of ‘the doctrinal disestablishment of sovereignty and blurring of the boundaries between 
public and private or international and municipal law’.7 
The last forty years witnessed the rise of the international law of property,8 which ‘(1) creates 
property rights; (2) protects property rights stemming from municipal laws; (3) coordinates 
property rights arising under municipal law; (4) restricts property rights authorized under 
municipal law; and (5) prohibits the creation of property rights under municipal law’.9 
International property law extends from the property-related aspects of human rights law to 
international investment law, from the law of the global commons to international intellectual 
property law. It encompasses property rights to immovable as well as movable, tangible as 
well as intangible ‘things’.10 Conceptually speaking, international property law has the same 
pedigree as its national-law constituents or derivatives. Not surprisingly then, its notion of 
property ‘is most commonly equated with the complete ownership of a particular thing – a 
comprehensive set of rights over the thing, including the rights to use, destroy, and transfer it 
and to exclude others from it’.11 
Going beyond the confines of international property law, our aim in this chapter is to unpack 
the conventional notion of property rights, which starts from absolute rights of the owner, just 
as state sovereignty was once considered absolute. Our argument is that if we speak of a 
universal right of property today, it can no longer rest on such absolutist foundations. Just as 
the post-Westphalian world is, or should be, characterized by limited sovereignty and a 
balance of rights and responsibilities between states, we have to conceive of property rights 
as limited, or correlated, between owners. Arguably, this reinterpretation of property rights 
                                                   
6 David Kennedy, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12 LJIL 9–133. 
7 Kennedy, ‘International Law in the Nineteenth Century’ (n 4 above), at 388. 
8 Sprankling, International Law of Property (n 1 above), at 14. 
9 Ibid, at 41. 
10 Ibid, at 28. 
11 Ibid, at 27. 
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matters for national as much as for transnational or international legal relations involving 
claims, or disputes, of ownership. 
 
INTRODUCTION: ADVANCING POLANYI AND COMMONS 
Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation12 begins with a section on ‘the international 
system’, which lists the key institutions of the political-economic order of the nineteenth 
century: the ‘international gold standard’, the ‘balance-of-power system’, the ‘self-regulating 
market’, and the ‘liberal state’.13 Studying the foundations of the modern market society, 
Polanyi naturally engaged with international law. One may even identify in his work the 
ingredients of a ‘sociology of international economic law’,14 which centres around the 
‘fictitious commodities’ of ‘land’, ‘labour’, and ‘money’.15 Given the intertwinement of 
public and private law, national and international law in regulating, or deregulating, the 
market, it seems adequate to extend the focus to ‘transnational economic law’, which defines 
the law of the market society not by its legal form but its economic function.16 Either way, 
many scholars interested in the legal framework of the reinvigorated market society of today 
draw inspiration from Polanyi’s work.17 
Polanyi started his career as a doctor of law, but gained his reputation as an economic 
historian, economic sociologist, or economic anthropologist. Within the interdisciplinary 
field of socio-economics and the sociological sub-discipline of economic sociology, The 
Great Transformation is rightfully regarded as a classic, which introduces and substantiates 
                                                   
12 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon 
Press 1957 [1944]). 
13 Ibid, ch. 1. 
14 Sabine Frerichs, ‘The Law of Market Society: A Sociology of International Economic Law and 
Beyond’ (2012/2013) 23 FYBIL 173–237. 
15 Polanyi, Great Transformation (n 12 above), ch. 6. 
16 Sabine Frerichs, ‘Transnational Law and Economic Sociology’ in Peer Zumbansen (ed.), Oxford 
Handbook of Transnational Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
17 See, for example, Christian Joerges and Josef Falke (eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the 
Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (Hart Publishing 2011); Amanda Perry-Kessaris (ed.), 
Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context, Subtext (Routledge 2012); 
Bettina Lange and Dania Thomas (eds), From Economy to Society? Perspectives on Transnational 
Risk Regulation (Emerald 2013). 
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the ‘embeddedness paradigm’. The idea that market exchange is (positively speaking) or 
should be (normatively speaking) ‘embedded’ in social relations can be seen as the lowest 
common denominator of economic sociology,18 whereas the neoclassical mainstream of the 
economic discipline is characterized by a ‘disembedded’ view of the market. And yet, the 
role of the law in ‘embedding’ or ‘disembedding’ market exchange did not receive much 
attention in contemporary economic sociology until, more recently, a call was made to 
develop an ‘economic sociology of law’.19 This resonates with efforts in the field of ‘law and 
society’ research, which coalesces around a socially embedded conception of law, to further 
‘a sociological approach to the interplay of law and the economy’.20 
The enterprise to advance the ‘economic sociology of law’ can build on the work of the 
classic sociologists, who were still concerned with the interaction of law, economy, and 
society in the formation and transformation of modern capitalism. This integrative 
perspective, which was shared by historical-holistic scholarship in economics as well as 
jurisprudence, disappeared from view in the increasing interdisciplinary division of labour in 
the social sciences, and in the intra-disciplinary specialization of the sociological discipline.21 
At the same time, the initiative to bring the law back into sociological and socio-economic 
thinking can also be understood as a response to the recent boom of ‘law and economics’22 as 
well as ‘new institutional economics’23 within the economics discipline. In these distinctive 
                                                   
18 Greta R. Krippner and Anthony S. Alvarez, ‘Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of 
Economic Sociology’ (2007) 33 Ann Rev Sociol 219–40. 
19 Richard Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of Law’ (2003) 32 Theory and Society 1–
37; Richard Swedberg, ‘Max Weber’s Contribution to the Economic Sociology of Law’ (2006) 2 Ann 
Rev Law Soc Sc 61–81. 
20 Lauren Edelman and Robin Stryker, ‘A Sociological Approach to Law and the Economy’ in Neil J. 
Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, (2nd edn., Princeton 
University Press 2005) 527–51, at 542. 
21 Sabine Frerichs, ‘Studying Law, Economy, and Society: A Short History of Socio-legal Thinking’ 
(2012) Helsinki Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2022891>accessed 14 July 2018. 
22 Ejan Mackaay ‘History of Law and Economics’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol I: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics 
(Edward Elgar 2000) 65–117. 
23 Peter G. Klein ‘New Institutional Economics’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol I: The History and Methodology of Law and Economics 
(Edward Elgar 2000) 456–89. 
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but intersecting areas of scholarship,24 the role of law is no longer taken for granted, as has 
long been the case in the neoclassical mainstream. Instead, what is studied are which 
differential effects public and private (legal) ordering or formal and informal (legal) 
institutions may have on economic performance. 
Taking a ‘Polanyi-inspired’ approach25 to property relations in the market society, this 
chapter continues earlier work outlining a ‘Polanyian’ economic sociology of law.26 Even 
though property was not an explicit focus of Polanyi’s institutional analysis,27 his interest in 
the commodification of land, labour, and money implies a deep concern with the capitalist 
overhaul of property relations. In modern capitalism, market exchange, which is premised on 
the individual assignment and alienability of property rights, has become a major principle of 
social organization. Moreover, one of the three fictitious commodities that Polanyi 
highlighted – ‘land’, which is the result of the commodification of nature – is commonly seen 
as the prototype of property. Historically, the expansion of agricultural and industrial 
capitalism entailed the ‘commercialization of the soil’ not only in the Western European 
countries, which were the pacemakers of capitalist development, but also in their colonies 
elsewhere in the world, whose natural resources were appropriated as well.28 According to 
Polanyi, the ‘mobilization’ of land and its produce was required to fit them ‘into the scheme 
of a self-regulating world market’,29 which underlies our ideas of free trade and the 
international division of labour. 
                                                   
24 Steven G. Medema, Nicholas Mercuro, and Warren Samuels, ‘Institutional Law and Economics’ in 
Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Vol I: The 
History and Methodology of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 418–55, at 439–40. 
25 Sally Randles, ‘Issues for a Neo-Polanyian Research Agenda in Economic Sociology’ (2003) 13 Int 
Rev Sociol 409–34, at 410; emphasis omitted. 
26 Sabine Frerichs, ‘Re-embedding Neo-liberal Constitutionalism: A Polanyian Case for the Economic 
Sociology of Law’ in Christian Joerges and Josef Falke (eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the 
Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (Hart Publishing 2011) 65–84; Sabine Frerichs, ‘From 
Credit to Crisis: Max Weber, Karl Polanyi, and the Other Side of the Coin’ (2013) 40 J Law and Soc 
7–26; Frerichs, ‘Law of Market Society’ (n 14 above). 
27 Karl Polanyi ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’ in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg and Harry 
W. Pearson (eds), Trade and Market in the Early Empires: Economies in History and Theory (Henry 
Regnery Company 1957) 243–70. 
28 Polanyi, Great Transformation (n 12 above), at 179. 
29 Ibid. 
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However, Polanyi’s work is not the only source of inspiration for this chapter. As pertinent to 
an understanding of the configuration of property relations in the market society is the work 
of John Roger Commons, which forms part of the ‘first wave of law and economics’.30 This 
antedates the neoclassical and neo-institutional ‘law and economics’ movement, which 
dominates the contemporary ‘economics of property rights’. The first wave of law and 
economics involved various strands of scholarship within the economic discipline, which are 
considered ‘heterodox’ from the perspective of modern standard economics, including the 
(German) Historical School and what is now referred to as Old (American) Institutionalism. 
The proponents of this older ‘law and economics’ movement shared with the classic 
sociologists an interest in historical-comparative scholarship, which took shape in the 
question ‘how property and other rights were determined, historically and functionally, 
across different societies’.31 Commons’s The Legal Foundations of Capitalism32 is a case in 
point. Focusing on ‘federal court decisions before and during the industrial period’, it 
documents a change in the ‘legal understanding of property and property rights’ in US-
American jurisprudence in the second half of the nineteenth century.33 
The third major element of this chapter comes from the doctoral thesis Rick James wrote 
when searching for a solution to the modern problems in intellectual property law.34 As part 
of that exercise, he created a property continuum which describes the evolution of property 
rights in all properties. The intent was to show that the absolute property rights found in 
intellectual property law were merely one form of property rights which had existed over the 
expanse of human history. He uses this continuum as support for his argument that, because 
the modern concept of universal property rights still rests on an antiquated understanding of 
absolute rights, this hampers an equitable distribution of benefits in highly differentiated, or 
integrated, relations of production. James’s property continuum is used here to advance the 
respective views of Polanyi and Commons regarding the contingency of property rights. 
                                                   
30 Mackaay ‘History of Law and Economics’ (n 22 above), at 69. 
31 Ibid. 
32 John Roger Commons, The Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Macmillan Company 1924). 
33 Karen McCally, ‘Free Labor Revised: John R. Commons, Property, and the American Welfare 
State’, paper presented at the Albion Tourgée Seminar in American Cultural History, 30 April 2015 
<https://www.rochester.edu/college/HIS/resources/tourgee/McCallyCommonsPaper.pdf>accessed 14 
July 2018, at 21. 
34 Rick James, Correlated Intellectual Property Rights: A Foundational Solution to the Problems of 
Patent Holdup and Patent Holdout. Doctoral Dissertation (University of Helsinki 2018). 
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By linking the works of Polanyi and Commons and taking their arguments one step further, 
this chapter demonstrates that the ‘old’ economic sociology and the ‘old’ institutional 
economics indeed had much in common, since scholars in both fields were interested in the 
institutional, or constitutional, premises of the modern market society. In contrast, in much of 
the ‘new’ economic sociology and the ‘new’ institutional economics, these premises are 
taken as given, and institutional analysis is confined to within variety in a capitalist setting. In 
this sense, the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ approaches is bigger than the difference 
between ‘economic’ and ‘sociological’ approaches that share the same, or a very similar, 
research paradigm. Be this as it may, this chapter takes a relational approach to property, with 
property rights not being confined to the ‘relation between an individual and a good’ but 
extending to ‘social relations between individuals’, owners as well as non-owners.35 
Moreover, given the legal nature and enforceability of property rights, they also include 
relations ‘between individuals and the state’.36 This perspective is applied to the expansion of 
private property rights into spheres of nature and knowledge which have so far escaped 
commodification, or what can be referred to as the ‘new enclosures’. 
Following this introduction, the argument proceeds in six steps. In the first step, we explore 
the classical beginnings of a sociological approach to property, which does not conceive of 
property as a thing or a right but as a social relation. The second section turns to Polanyi’s 
account of the first enclosure movement and the commodification of nature, or the 
proliferation of private property in land. The third section deals with Commons’s account of 
the evolution of the concept of property in the industrial age: from focusing on the use-value 
of physical objects to emphasizing the exchange-value of marketable assets. In the fourth 
step, which largely draws on James’s work, today’s regime of universal property rights is 
presented as an evolutionary stage in the history of property regimes, which has not come to 
an end yet. In the fifth step, the different historical accounts by Polanyi, Commons, and 
James are connected, suggesting that the property regime of market society consists both of 
the reification of property, identifying it with a thing, and the commodification of the right of 
ownership. The sixth section asks what type of property relations the knowledge-based 
economy of today takes to the fore, and what conceptual adaptations this may entail, again 
                                                   
35 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, ‘Much of the “Economics of Property Rights” Devalues Property and Legal 
Rights’ in (2015) 11 J Int Econ 683–709, at 689. 
36 Ibid. 
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drawing on James’s dissertation. The final section concludes with the suggestion that a 
suitable response to property rights absolutism is not to abolish private property altogether, 
but to further develop the relational quality of property rights. 
 
CLASSICS: CONCEIVING PROPERTY AS SOCIAL RELATION 
Is property a right or a thing? Lawyers may easily concur in that it is a right, or a bundle of 
rights. For economists it has not always been that clear. It was long held that the land owned 
or the commodities exchanged on the market were property. And even in today’s economics 
of property rights, a sharp distinction between property as the legal right of ownership and 
possession as the actual control over things seems to be missing.37 And sociologists? They 
may beg to differ from both lawyers and economists and emphasize that property is a relation 
and, eventually, a relation of power. However, in the works of the classic sociologists, who 
were naturally influenced by the economic and legal discourses of their time, property 
relations were not yet explored in full. Traces of a one-sided understanding of property as a 
relation between thing and person, to the exclusion of all others, can still be found both in 
Durkheim’s and Weber’s work. 
Writing in the late nineteenth century, Durkheim identifies law as an indicator of social 
solidarity, with ‘restitutory’ and ‘repressive’ law suggesting different forms of social 
integration.38 Whereas repressive law, which is characterized by punitive sanctions, was more 
typical for traditional societies, and can still be found in criminal law, the prevalent type of 
law in modern societies is restitutory in orientation. This is clearly the case for the law 
ordering the market economy, whose rationale is to restore rightful relations, such as by 
claiming damages for breaches of contract. Property law certainly forms part of modern 
‘economic law’, but Durkheim distinguishes it from other areas of private law, such as 
‘contractual law’ and ‘commercial law’, not to mention public law, including ‘procedural 
law, administrative and constitutional law’.39 What makes property law special, in 
Durkheim’s perspective, is that it is about the ‘negative relationship … which joins a thing to 
                                                   
37 Hodgson, ‘Economics of Property Rights’ (n 35 above). 
38 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (Macmillan 1984 [1893]). 
39 Ibid, at 77. 
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a person’,40 whereas (all) other fields of law would concern relations between persons. 
Accordingly, ‘[t]he relationships that are regulated by these [other] laws … express a positive 
contribution, a co-operation deriving essentially from the division of labour’.41 In other 
words, they further the integration of modern societies, which are highly differentiated in 
nature, by balancing the rights and duties of the different parties to a relationship. 
Writing in the early twentieth century, Weber distinguishes between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ 
relationships and introduces property relations as a special case of the latter, which would 
exclude ‘outsiders’.42 Put differently, closed relationships are characterized by ‘monopolized 
advantages’, which may be allocated or distributed in different ways in a group of 
‘insiders’.43 However, in the case of ‘[a]ppropriated advantages’, everybody else is excluded 
but the owner, who enjoys ‘[property] “rights”’.44 This is what private property is about. 
Accordingly, ‘the individual may enjoy his rights on a purely personal basis’ as well as 
bequeath them to his heirs.45 Moreover, depending on the property regime in place, ‘it may 
be that the [rights-]holder is more or less fully empowered to alienate his rights by voluntary 
agreement’,46 such as by selling them to somebody else. Including this aspect of alienability, 
Weber speaks of ‘“free” property’,47 which obviously plays a central role in the market 
economy. In the context of production, appropriated advantages include ‘the opportunities of 
disposing of, and obtaining a return from, human labor services …, the material means of 
production; and the opportunities for profit from managerial functions’.48 This suggests that 
not only the ‘physical’ production factors of land and capital can be considered objects of 
property but also the ‘opportunities for profit’ derived from management and labour.49 
                                                   
40 Ibid, at 72. 
41 Ibid, at 77. 
42 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California 
Press 1978 [1922]), at 43. 
43 Ibid, at 44. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, at 126; references omitted. 
49 Cf. John Roger Commons, Institutional Economics: Its Place in Political Economy (University of 
Wisconsin Press 1959 [1934]), at 251. 
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Historically, the debate about property rights can be structured around two poles: the natural 
rights school and the conventional school. The natural rights school argues that private 
property is natural, fair, and efficient. Accordingly, private property corresponds to the 
‘original state of humans’ or is at least considered to be ‘more consistent with human nature’ 
than common property.50 For the conventional school, private property is not natural but 
conventional, and it is held that common property was the historical ‘norm’.51 The idea that 
private property is not given but may become ‘naturalized’ in social discourse and practices 
obviously forms part of conventionalist thinking, which today can also be labelled 
‘constructivist’. This perspective can be condensed as follows: ‘The meaning of property is 
not constant. The actual institution, and the way people see it, and hence the meaning they 
give to the word, all change over time.’52 Moreover, the ‘basic question’ of who owns what, 
which purportedly ‘existed throughout human history’,53 is premised on an answer to the 
even more fundamental questions of who can own and what can be owned in the first place; 
that is, the definition of legitimate ‘subjects’ and ‘objects’ of property.54 Finally, even the 
distinction between subjects and objects of property is nothing fixed. In reality, certain 
objects of property (slaves, spouses, animals, companies) could also become legal subjects 
and, thus, right-holders and potential owners by themselves. 
Within Marxist scholarship, it has long been emphasized that ‘[c]apitalist society is above all 
a society of commodity owners’, of which the concepts of private property, contract of will, 
and legal personhood are regarded as constitutive.55 According to this line of thinking, the 
concept of ownership is inherently connected with the institution of the market: ‘only the 
development of the market initially makes possible and necessary the transformation of man, 
                                                   
50 Franklin Obeng-Odoom, ‘Property in the Commons: Origins and Paradigms’ (2016) 48 Rev Radic 
Polit Econ 9–19, at 11. 
51 Ibid, at 11. 
52 Crawford B. Macpherson ‘The Meaning of Property’ in Crawford B. Macpherson (ed.), Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions (Basil Blackwell 1978) 1–13, at 1. 
53 Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the 
New Institutional Economics (2nd edn., University of Michigan Press 2010), at 79. 
54 Bruce G. Carruthers and Laura Ariovich, ‘The Sociology of Property Rights’ (2004) 30 Ann Rev 
Sociol 23–46. 
55 Evgeny Pashukanis ‘The General Theory of Law and Marxism’ in Piers Beirne and Robert Sharlet 
(eds), Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (Academic Press 1980 [1924]) 40–131, at 
75. 
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who appropriates objects by means of labour (or theft), into a legal owner’.56 The relation 
between thing and person is not interpreted in ‘naturalist’ ways, say, of man controlling a 
piece of land and his belongings, but in ‘constructivist’ terms. In fact, thing and person are 
regarded as mutually constituted entities that owe their ‘existence’ to the concepts of private 
property and legal personhood, which both arise from the capitalist principle of market 
exchange. The emphasis of this approach is not so much on the relation between thing and 
person than on how the ‘relation of objects, commodities’, exchanged on the market, is 
reflected in ‘will relationships of individuals independent and equal to one another – legal 
subjects’.57 Against this backdrop, the task for a sociology of property rights is to understand 
property not in ‘absolutist’ terms but to emphasize its ‘relational’ qualities in a network of 
social, or capitalist, relations. Characteristically, these relations involve the exchange of 
commodities and, concomitantly, the transfer of ownership, but also the coordination of 
different property claims. 
 
POLANYI’S COMMONS: THE COMMODIFICATION OF NATURE 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation includes an assessment of the English ‘enclosure 
movement’, which turned common land into private property. Whereas the overall process 
‘started in the fifteenth century and went on … until the nineteenth century’,58 Polanyi first 
deals with the enclosures between the late fifteenth and seventeenth century only, which 
preceded, and literally prepared the ground for, the Industrial Revolution. In the chapter 
entitled ‘Habitation versus Improvement’,59 which alludes to the political rhetoric of the time, 
he characterizes the enclosures as furthering ‘economic progress … at the price of social 
dislocation’.60 Moreover, he replicates the assessment that this ultimately was ‘a revolution of 
the rich against the poor’.61 In line with critical scholarship before and after him,62 Polanyi 
                                                   
56 Ibid, at 84. 
57 Ibid, at 79. 
58 James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain’ 
(2003) 66 Law Contemp Probl 33–74, at 34, fn. 2. 
59 Polanyi, Great Transformation (n 12 above), ch. 3. 
60 Ibid, at 34. 
61 Ibid, at 35. 
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points out that the appropriation of the commons was premised on the negation of customary 
rights. This is evident in the following passage: 
The lords and nobles were upsetting the social order, breaking down ancient law and 
custom, sometimes by means of violence, often by pressure and intimidation. They 
were literally robbing the poor of their share in the common, tearing down the houses 
which, by the hitherto unbreakable force of custom, the poor had long regarded as 
theirs and their heirs.63 
Regarding the trade-off between ‘habitation’ and ‘improvement’, Polanyi’s argument is not 
that economic progress, which was meant to be facilitated by the enclosures, could never 
compensate for the social dislocation which they eventually entailed, but that ‘[t]he time-rate 
of change compared with the time-rate of adjustment will decide what is to be regarded as the 
net effect of the change’.64 Along these lines, he suggests that the enclosure movement in 
pre-industrial England turned out to be ‘less devastating’65 than it possibly could have been, 
given that ‘the Tudors and the early Stuarts used the power of the Crown to slow down the 
process of economic improvement until it became socially bearable’.66 Put differently, even if 
legislation did not really manage to keep the enclosures in check, at least it did not accelerate 
them. This was already Marx’s point, who noted that, at first, ‘the process [of turning arable 
into pasture land] was carried on by means of individual acts of violence against which 
legislation … fought in vain’ whereas ‘[t]he advance made by the 18th century shows itself 
in this, that the law itself becomes now the instrument of the theft of the people’s land’.67 
Polanyi returns to this matter in a later chapter, which is entitled ‘Market and Nature’68 and 
which elaborates on ‘land’ as a fictitious commodity, next to ‘labour’69 and ‘money’.70 The 
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concept of fictitious commodities is formulated against the backdrop of a ‘substantivist’ 
approach which emphasizes the close interrelation of man and nature in traditional societies. 
However, the idea of an intact social metabolism does not have to reflect a historical, or 
premodern, condition only, and it can also be found in contemporary, or postmodern, 
concepts of sustainable development. Moreover, it also informs the original understanding of 
the embeddedness paradigm, even though the latter can be given a more ‘constructivist’ 
reading as well.71 For Polanyi, the defining feature of fictitious commodities is that they are 
traded on the market but have not been produced for the market in the first place. Instead, 
‘[l]abor is only another name for a human activity which goes with life itself’, ‘land is only 
another name for nature, which is not produced by man’, and ‘actual money … is merely a 
token of purchasing power which … comes into being through the mechanism of banking or 
state finance’.72 Whereas the true substance of money is harder to define,73 labour and land 
are, in the uncommodified state, ‘no other than the human beings themselves of which every 
society consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists’, and ‘[t]o include them in the 
market mechanism means to subordinate the substance of society itself to the laws of the 
market’.74 
In the case of land, the commodification process can now be identified with the enclosure 
movement as a whole, including its continuation, with the sanction of the British Parliament, 
in the eighteenth century, which was a premise for accomplishing the ‘industrial-agricultural 
division of labor’ of today, ‘first on a national, then on a world scale’.75 Polanyi describes the 
overall process as consisting of three stages: abolishment of feudal structures preventing the 
commercialization of land; increase in the productivity of the land to feed a rapidly 
increasing urban population; and ‘the extension of such a system of surplus production to 
overseas and colonial territories’.76 As to the latter step, he adds that ‘[t]o effect this change 
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was the true meaning of free trade’,77 which hints at the role of international economic law, 
or of the law of a market society going global. 
From a neo-Polanyian point of view, the enclosure movement is far from over. Instead of 
understanding enclosure ‘as a periodizing concept set prior to the ascent of capitalist property 
relations’ only, it can also be considered ‘as an ongoing process that in different capacities 
and forms preceded, initiated and continues to accompany ongoing capital accumulation’.78 
Along these lines, social scientists have come to apply ‘the lens of enclosure’79 to phenomena 
that go far beyond the commercialization of the soil as such. While some scholars have 
preserved a substantivist approach and now speak, in more general terms, of the 
commodification of natural resources, which ‘extend beyond land to water bodies, subsurface 
minerals, wildlife habitats, genetic substances, carbon sequestration zones, and seascapes’,80 
others have turned to the commodification of intellectual resources, or knowledge,81 or what 
Boyle refers to as ‘the enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind’.82 Arguably, then, 
there is a new dimension to the enclosure process, or a shift of emphasis from real property to 
intellectual property. This change in the subject of enclosure is obviously premised on a 
change in the concept of property itself: from more concrete to more abstract notions of what 
can be ‘enclosed’, or from a more substantivist to a more constructivist understanding. This is 
where Commons comes in. 
 
COMMONS’S PROPERTY: THE TURN TO THE EXCHANGE-VALUE 
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As a representative of the earlier ‘law and economics’ movement, ‘Commons probably did 
more than anyone else to establish the importance of legal matters for economics’,83 with two 
of his books ‘now serv[ing] as a benchmark for institutional law and economics’:84 The Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism,85 which was already mentioned above, and Institutional 
Economics,86 an outline of what is now dubbed ‘old institutionalism’. For Commons, legal 
institutions were crucial for an understanding of capitalist development. In his writings, he 
was able to draw on insights gained by ‘his … involvement with the courts, his service on 
government commissions and his drafting of legislation’ in the US-American legal system.87 
In The Legal Foundations of Capitalism, Commons retraces the evolution of the concept of 
(private) property in the case law of American federal courts in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. His study exposes the historical contingency of property law as ‘man-
made law’ as opposed to the timeless quality of ‘natural law’.88 Characteristic of the first 
wave of law and economics, Commons was as much interested in ‘how economy influences 
law’ as in ‘how law influences the economy’,89 that is, how the development of economic 
structures and the development of legal concepts go hand in hand. 
What the US case law in the period under scrutiny reveals is that the concept of property 
changed from a preoccupation with the ‘use-value’ of things to emphasizing its ‘exchange-
value’.90 Whereas in an earlier stage of capitalist development, the concept of property was 
confined to absolute control over things, in the later stage it came to include more abstract 
privileges, or opportunities for profit. Accordingly, the Supreme Court had first held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution protected only the exclusive use of physical 
property by its owner.91 This ‘primitive definition of property as the mere holding of physical 
objects for one’s own use and enjoyment’92 was still the majority position in court cases 
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decided in the early 1870s, although some justices were already dissenting. In 1890, then, it 
was acknowledged by the majority of the court that property may not only rest in the 
monopolization of the use-value of concrete, physical things, but also in the ‘propertization’ 
of the exchange-value of potentially more abstract things. In 1897, the court ruled that 
‘selling property is an essential part of liberty and property as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’, and thus made more explicit that the exchange-value is linked to market 
access.93 Indeed, a constitutive feature of modern capitalism seems to be that all things or 
rights owned are ultimately tradeable: they can be transferred for a market price. 
To illustrate the different dimensions of property, Commons distinguishes between corporeal 
and incorporeal property as well as intangible property. Whereas incorporeal property 
consists of ‘debts, credits, bonds, mortgages, in short, of promises to pay’, intangible 
property may consist of the ‘exchange-value of anything whether corporeal property or 
incorporeal property or even intangible property’94 or, in short, of ‘opportunities for profit’.95 
Commons points out that ‘anything’ can have an exchange-value, ‘whether it be one’s 
reputation, one’s horse, house or land, one’s ability to work, one’s goodwill, patent right, 
good credit, stocks, bonds or bank deposit’.96 In turn, the exchange-value of property 
includes ‘anything that enables one to obtain from others an income in the process of buying 
and selling, borrowing and lending, hiring and hiring out, renting and leasing, in any of the 
transactions of modern business’.97 Put differently, it consists in the ‘earning potential’ of any 
form of property in any form of market exchange. Hence, whereas the ‘primitive’ concept of 
property focused on physical things and their more or less concrete uses, the more 
‘sophisticated’ concept of property at the turn of the twentieth century includes all kinds of 
‘marketable assets’, even the most intangible ones.98 These alternative understandings are 
also contrasted as the traditional ‘common-law meaning’ and the modern ‘business-law 
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meaning’ of property.99 It is the latter which better reflects the advances of industrial 
capitalism. 
The legal cases analysed by Commons concern the question to what extent state regulation 
may interfere with constitutionally protected individual rights. This is also the setting of the 
famous Lochner case of 1905, in which it was held that a state law limiting the working hours 
of employees in the baking industry would violate the freedom of contract. For Commons, 
the related line auf cases raises the issue of economic power, or the relative bargaining power 
of the parties of a contract, which is determined by the market price.100 He argues that state 
laws, such as ‘[p]ublic-utility laws, usury laws, labor laws’, some of which have been 
declared unconstitutional by the courts, were ‘designed … to curb the bargaining-power of 
property where it seems to be excessive’.101 For him, there is thus a legitimate public interest 
in controlling the economic power derived from property.102 With the ‘propertization’ of the 
exchange-value, the economic lever of property owners has arguably increased. 
Commons’s interest in the unequal bargaining power on the market can only be understood if 
property rights are conceived in strictly relational terms. The starting point is a conception of 
capitalism as a form of social organization, which consists in ‘production for the use of others 
and acquisition for the use of self’.103 In other words, economic survival is premised on 
market exchange, or what Commons refers to as ‘transactions’.104 Under these conditions, 
property can no longer be perceived as absolute control but has to be understood as relation 
of power: ‘the power of property [is] the economic power to withhold from others what 
belongs to self but is needed by others’.105 It is against this backdrop that the transition from 
use-value to exchange-value in the understanding of property rights can also be understood as 
‘a change from a concept of holding things for one’s own use to withholding things from 
others’ use’.106 Thus, a constitution that protects private property and the freedom of contract 
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automatically also sanctions the use, or abuse, of economic power based on these principles. 
Applying this conceptual framework to the Lochner case, the core issue was ‘the power of 
property over employees’,107 which mirrors Polanyi’s concern with the commodification of 
labour. Whereas neoclassical economics works against the background assumption of a 
liberal state that protects private property rights, without analysing it any further,108 old 
institutional economics considers the state a ‘third party’ that can never be neutral, as by 
defining rights it either privileges one side or the other.109 In short, the bargaining power on 
the market is shaped by the legal framework. 
 
A HISTORY OF THE PRESENT: THE PROPERTY CONTINUUM 
According to the ‘economic analysis of law’, which forms the mainstream of contemporary 
‘law and economics’, an efficient property regime is characterized by the ‘universality’, the 
‘exclusivity’, and the ‘transferability’ of property rights: 
If every valuable (meaning scarce as well as desired) resource were owned by 
someone (universality), if ownership connoted the unqualified power to exclude 
everybody else from using the resource (exclusivity) as well as to use it oneself, and if 
ownership rights were freely transferable, or as lawyers say alienable (transferability), 
value would be maximized.110 
Strictly speaking, this is neither an empirical account of how property rights are organized, 
nor a normative claim as to how they should be organized, but a conditional statement that 
reflects the restrictive assumptions of neoclassical economic theory about rational action and 
efficient markets. On the other hand, property rights regimes indeed seem to have moved 
towards universality, exclusivity, and transferability throughout history, to the effect that in 
the market society of today these criteria are often taken for granted. And yet, it is important 
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to mark them as the contingent result of the evolution of the idea and institution of property, 
which does not have to stop here. 
What is of interest in the present context is not only the universality of property rights in the 
sense that all limited resources are privately owned, or at least capable of being owned and, 
consequently, that all in need of limited resources have to be capable of becoming owners; 
that is, to acquire ownership rights. The universality of private ownership also suggests that 
this regime of property rights is ultimately global: it concerns resources everywhere in the 
world and considers everyone a potential owner who may exclude everybody else from using 
the appropriated resources. Moreover, the transfer of property rights can also take a global 
dimension, with ownership titles being traded and exchanged across the world. Considering 
that the prototype of property, in terms of the object owned, is land, this globalization can by 
no means be taken as a given. The regulation of land ownership is, or at least used to be, 
quintessentially local: ‘The traditional concept of land law was that it literally represented the 
“law of the land”.’111 This distinguishes land law from other fields of law, such as merchant 
law or maritime law, which naturally involved cross-border transactions and were therefore 
more prone to the creation of universal norms.112 More recently, however, with ‘exporters of 
capital … increasingly investing in real estate around the globe’,113 domestic land laws have 
likewise become more aligned with the global law of the market. In this sense, the 
universality of property rights ultimately implies one global regime for all, which only 
reflects the universalist assumptions of the ‘economics of property rights’.114 However, it can 
be argued that this universality and the neoclassical proposition of exclusivity represent a 
relatively modern construct. 
According to James, the history of property rights should really be defined on a property 
continuum which consists of three successive phases: a ‘common property phase’, a 
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‘concentrated property phase’, and a ‘universal property phase’.115 The common property 
phase refers to a phase in early society where the land was considered to be a common 
heritage of all the people which reflected their shared existence as a group. It can be assumed 
that this was the case for the longest time in human history in what is referred to as the Stone 
Age. The common property phase may be further subdivided into a ‘communal property 
stage’ with little social differentiation and a ‘tribal property stage’, which shows first signs of 
a division of labour. As written records from the primordial stage of communal property are 
lacking, it is impossible to say anything definite about the ‘legal’ quality of ownership in this 
period. However, the available archaeological evidence seems to suggest a primitive property 
stage which consisted of communal property developed and maintained by small 
communities for the benefit of the entire community. This ancient idea of communal 
property, according to which the land sustaining a community is owned by the very 
collective, obviously differs from the modern idea of individual property, according to which 
everybody owns and controls a distinct share to the exclusion of others, but also from the 
contemporary concept of global commons, according to which certain non-exclusive 
resources are shared by humanity as a whole. The tribal property stage, which follows the 
strictly communal stage, is characterized by an incipient division of labour, which includes 
elements of a formal hierarchical structure with specialized functions for leadership. The 
institutionalization of different roles, which probably involved the attribution of usage rights 
with respect to land, can already be seen as a first step in the transition from common to 
private property. However, in ancient tribal communities the communal element still 
remained dominant. 
In the concentrated ownership phase, property rights were held and controlled by small 
centralized bodies within a society. In the extreme case, everything would be owned by one 
individual leader only: an absolute ruler with absolute property rights. The transition from the 
common property phase to the concentrated property phase might have been triggered by 
different communities competing for the same fertile land or hunting grounds, with some 
tribes being able to appropriate the resources of the others. It is plausible that the contest for 
scarce resources furthered the establishment of a warrior class, whose members were 
                                                   
115 James, Correlated Intellectual Property Rights (n 34 above), ch. 14: A Theoretical Property 
Continuum, at 408-512. In what follows, we give a brief summary of James’s much more detailed 
account of the property continuum. 
 
 
 23 
rewarded for their services by retaining a share of the appropriations for themselves. Thus, 
one can assume that the concentrated property phase had its beginnings in a ‘warlord 
property stage’, in which taking property by warfare became an accepted development 
method for the society. The acquired property could include land as much as labour, by 
enslaving members of the conquered tribes. Whereas regimes of warlord property had mainly 
relied on brute force, the ensuing stage of ‘royal property’ invoked divine right as a new, or 
additional, source of legitimation, which allowed for further centralization of ownership in 
what would become vast empires. It is in this period that the absolutism of property rights 
reached its peak. As is well known, modern legal developments took off from a criticism of 
the concept of absolute dominion, which ultimately inspired the civil revolutions of the 
eighteenth century. 
However, the transition from absolute rule and concentrated property to democratic rule and 
universal property was not abrupt but led over stages of noble property and aristocratic 
property, in which royal property was increasingly ‘diluted’, as it came to be shared with the 
highest ranks of the king’s loyal or rebelling subordinates. In the ‘noble property stage’, this 
dilution of ownership did not yet entail a corresponding diminution in claims of absolute 
authority with regard to the civil population. However, with the rise of the merchant class, the 
nobles could no longer assume that they could exercise absolute authority over their property 
regardless of the consequences to their society. Instead, they had to give way to the property 
rights of the merchants. This change occurred in the ‘aristocratic property stage’, which 
witnessed a change in the legitimation of property from divine providence to natural rights. 
In the end, the natural-law justification of property as the fruit of one’s labour, which might 
include ‘[a]s much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product 
of’,116 would also undermine the concentration of property in the hand of aristocrats. 
However, the revolutionary content of this idea took time to unfold, while aristocrats 
continued to enjoy various legal privileges. In mercantilist times, another form of aristocratic 
property eventually emerged in the form of trade monopolies. These privileged trading rights, 
which were granted to government-chartered trading companies, provided opportunities to 
only a few select merchants. In other words, the property rights regime still remained 
relatively exclusive. 
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In contrast, the universal property phase is defined by the legal and practical possibility of all 
individuals in society to own property. These universal property rights were premised on both 
the availability and ownership possibilities of new world property which led to the modern 
civil revolutions, and the advances of commercial and industrial capitalism, which created 
new forms of property. We can speak of the birth of the market society, which both presumes 
and promotes a new justification of property rights: economic efficiency. While this type of 
thinking is reflected in today’s ‘economics of property rights’, which reduces property 
relations to their potential contribution to economic growth, the sociology of property rights 
is more interested in property relations as such, which can be considered a constitutive 
element of the globalized market society. With the expansion of property rights to the entire 
population, the potential for conflict between individual property owners increased as well. 
The ‘doctrine of absolute property rights’, which emerged in the concentrated ownership 
phase, is now applied to a much more dispersed property structure. Instead of the feudal 
relations between sovereign and subjects, or between one landowner and a multitude of 
tenants, modern capitalism brings the relations between different property owners to the fore. 
This is evident in exchange relations, but already the assignment of individual property rights 
has distinctive social implications. Whereas the ‘universality’ and ‘transferability’ of 
property rights are relatively new features, the ‘exclusivity’ of property rights has its origins 
in absolute rule. Having been passed on from warlords to monarchs, nobility, and aristocrats, 
in what were concentrated property regimes, the idea of exclusive property rights is now 
applied to all economic actors. 
 
SYNTHESIS: THE PROPERTY REGIME OF MARKET SOCIETY 
In the market society, property relations are commodified in the sense that they are mediated 
by the market price, which expresses, according to Commons, the relative economic power of 
the parties. Quite obviously, then, property can no longer be equated with the thing owned, 
be it corporeal, incorporeal or intangible. However, what stood at the beginning of modern 
capitalism was, precisely, a reified understanding of property. This is suggested in a passage 
by Macpherson, which helps to connect Polanyi’s account of the enclosure movement with 
Commons’s account of the transition from use-value to exchange-value. With regard to 
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England, Macpherson argues that, until the seventeenth century, ‘the great bulk of property 
was … property in land, and a man’s property in a piece of land was generally limited to 
certain uses of it and was often not freely disposable’, while ‘another substantial segment of 
property consisted of those rights to revenue which were provided by such things as 
corporate charters, monopolies granted by the state, tax-farming rights, and the incumbency 
of various political and ecclesiastical offices’.117 Obviously, these property rights concerned 
material as well as immaterial ‘things’, uses of land as well as opportunities for profit which 
were granted by the authorities. However, because ownership titles were either lacking 
exclusiveness or alienability, there was, as yet, little risk of conflating rights with things. 
This changed with ‘the spread of the full capitalist market economy from the seventeenth 
century on’, which entailed ‘the replacement of the old limited rights in land and other 
valuable things by virtually unlimited rights’.118 In other words, property rights took the form 
of ‘full or complete ownership’, which includes the right to use (ius utendi), the right to 
derive income from (ius fruendi), and the right to consume or alienate (ius abutendi) the thing 
owned.119 Macpherson’s argument continues as follows: 
<quotation>As rights in land became more absolute, and parcels of land became more 
freely marketable commodities, it became natural to think of the land itself as the 
property. And as aggregations of commercial and industrial capital, operating in 
increasingly free markets and themselves freely marketable, overtook in bulk the older 
kinds of moveable wealth based on charters and monopolies, the capital itself, whether 
in money or in the form of actual plant, could easily be thought of as the 
property.120</quotation> 
Hence, in a nutshell, modern capitalism changed the idea of property from ‘limited and not 
always saleable rights in things’ to ‘virtually unlimited and saleable rights to things’, that is, 
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from relative, or divided, property rights to absolute, or exclusive, property rights, which 
could easily be equated with the things themselves.121 
Whereas the popular understanding of property is thus characterized by a certain confusion 
between rights and things, the distinction obviously matters from a legal point of view. At the 
same time, the link between capitalist development and the development of legal concepts, 
which ‘old’ institutionalists were interested in, is preserved. One could thus claim that the 
reification of property as a thing, in terms of the commodification of natural and human 
resources, is complemented by the commodification of the right of ownership, which was 
fictitious to begin with but which has now become exclusive and alienable enough to be 
traded on the market. The idea that it was not the (material or immaterial) object of property 
but ‘ownership that was bought and sold’ can already be found in the work of Henry Dunning 
MacLeod, which dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century and is discussed at 
length in Commons’s Institutional Economics.122 For Commons, MacLeod was ‘the first 
lawyer-economist’123 and ultimately the ‘originator’ of institutional economics.124 
The property law of market society clearly forms part of the universal property phase, in 
which all members of society have the legal and practical possibility to own property.125 
However, like the common property phase and the concentrated property phase, the universal 
property phase can be subdivided into different stages. It begins with the ‘free-market 
property stage’, which came to dominate the nineteenth century, building on the liberal 
theories of classical political economy. The crisis of this laissez-faire model evoked a 
counter-reaction, which is reflected in a series of three regulated property stages, with 
incrementally decreasing levels of regulation in the twentieth century. With the pendulum 
swinging back from (more) regulation to (more) deregulation, one could even see a new free-
market property stage emerge towards the end of the twentieth century. However, the 
commodification of property rights was taken furthest at the beginning of the universal 
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property phase. While property rights had become generalized, they were still considered as 
absolute. It was during the free-market property stage that property owners had the greatest 
flexibility of doing whatever they wanted with their property regardless of the consequence 
for other members of society. While property was, in principle, accessible to all, in practice 
there were huge differences in economic power. In the absence of government regulation, 
powerful property owners could seek to control the markets solely for their own benefit and 
to the detriment of society as a whole. 
In the following stages, the attempt to strike a balance between economic efficiency and 
social equity brought about more regulated markets, and more restricted property rights. 
Commons’s argument that state laws interfering with absolute property rights could serve to 
balance the bargaining power of owners with that of tenants, employees, debtors or 
consumers marks a time when the courts were still wrestling with the constitutionality of 
such interventions; that is, the beginning of a more regulated property stage.126 Depending on 
the degree of government involvement, one could distinguish ‘directed’, ‘restricted’, and 
‘supervised’ property stages, in which property owners, or capitalist enterprises, are either 
told by the state what to do (such as through wage or price controls), what not to do (such as 
engaging in anti-competitive behaviour), or business practices are otherwise subject to 
scrutiny (such as under the ‘rule of reason’).127 Within the overall development of property 
regimes, the stage of regulated markets marks a turning point in that property rights came to 
be conceived in less absolutist ways. Property was no longer defined as an item of unitary 
ownership with an implied understanding of absolute dominion, but as a bundle of legal 
relationships that could be separated into individual rights and duties. This ‘bundle of rights’ 
conception made it possible to restrict certain rights, or to accentuate the respective duties, 
while leaving other rights, or even the majority of rights, intact. Put differently, the law could 
now circumscribe the institution of ownership without violating its substance, which made it 
possible to strike a balance between the interests of property owners (maintaining their 
incentive to invest), the needs of the market (introducing competition policies), and society as 
a whole (furthering social and environmental policies). On the other hand, any particular 
right, or ‘stick’, in the bundle of rights that was not restricted could still be regarded as an 
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absolute right. Arguably, these leftovers of a property rights absolutism still make it difficult 
to fully internalize the external effects of property ownership. 
 
FUTURE: FROM ABSOLUTE TO CORRELATED PROPERTY RIGHTS? 
Taking the variability of capitalist social formations as given, ‘[c]hanges in the objects of 
property depend on [the respective grade of] commodification and de-commodification’,128 
that is, to what extent the market mechanism is used as a means of social organization in 
different policy fields. While the works of Polanyi and Commons referred to the age of 
agricultural and industrial capitalism, the acceptable scope of commodification is also subject 
to debate in the knowledge-based economy of today. Focusing on recent developments in the 
domain of intellectual property rights, Boyle speaks of a ‘second enclosure movement’ 
triggered by the information revolution. With the proliferation of digital technologies, 
questions arise concerning the respective rights of producers and users of so-called 
‘information goods’. The parallel between the old and the new enclosure movement can be 
seen in the limitation of user rights to what could be freely shared before: ‘once again things 
that were formerly thought of as either common property or uncommodifiable are being 
covered with new, or newly extended, property rights’.129 Like Commons, Boyle starts from 
the duality of property rights, namely that holding things or reserving technologies for one’s 
own use means withholding them from others’ use. Accordingly, an extension of property 
rights in informational goods means a restriction of user rights in the public domain.130 
Boyle’s concern is not only the loss of individual user rights but also the foreclosure of a 
collective mode of production.131 For illustration, he contrasts the model of competitive, 
exclusive, proprietary production under a restrictive intellectual property regime with a 
model of cooperative, distributed, non-proprietary production in the public domain or, what 
is almost the same, under a general public licence.132 
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In neoclassical and neo-institutional (law and) economics, private property rights are 
considered constitutive for the functioning of the market economy, given that they would act 
as an incentive for economic actors ‘to maximize the value of their property and thus also 
further the “wealth of nations”’.133 The presumption is that economic actors have to be 
sufficiently sure that they can reap the fruit of their labour, or investment.134 Put differently, 
they have to be able to exclude others from the benefits of their work: ‘The more exclusive 
are property rights to the individual or group the greater the incentive to maintain the value of 
the asset. Furthermore, more exclusive rights increase the incentive to improve the value of 
the asset by investment …’135 
The standard case for private property rights is also applied to the area of ‘intellectual’, 
‘informational’, or ‘innovational’ production. Generally speaking, intellectual, or 
‘immaterial’, property rights are meant to fulfil the same function as material property rights: 
‘to protect the holder of rights against unauthorized use of his assets’.136 However, in contrast 
to material goods, which typically can be used only in one or the other way, or by one or 
another, immaterial goods are generally ‘non-rival’ in their use, which means that different 
uses, and users, do not interfere with each other. Moreover, without artificial barriers, 
informational goods are ‘non-excludable’, which means that ‘it is impossible, or at least hard, 
to stop one unit of the good from satisfying an indefinite number of users at zero marginal 
cost’.137 Hence, in the case of intellectual property rights, the exclusions of others does not 
serve to protect the substance of the property; instead, the limitation of users’ rights seems 
necessary to incentivize the provision of informational goods.138 However, as Boyle aims to 
show, the case for intellectual property rights is not as clear as the economic standard 
argument suggests. Whereas in the case of land, or limited natural resources, a lack of private 
property rights may indeed create individual incentives for overuse and conjure a ‘tragedy of 
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the commons’,139 provided that no alternative governance mechanisms are in place,140 the 
propertization of intellectual or cultural production may eventually result in a ‘tragedy of the 
anti-commons’,141 as it restricts the access to information goods from which other 
information goods are created.142 In this sense, ‘enclosure of the information commons 
clearly has the potential to harm innovation as well as to support it’.143 Accordingly, the 
underuse of creative resources can be considered as much of a problem as the overuse of 
natural resources. 
While James recognizes the potential economic problems embedded in current thinking about 
intellectual property, he views the enclosure effects quite differently from Boyle.144 Whereas 
Boyle tends to regard the enclosure from the perspective of preventing freely shared access to 
innovations, James views enclosure in terms of preventing intellectual property owners from 
receiving an equitable share of the rewards that are created by an integrated technological 
product. Specifically, he is concerned that multinational high-tech manufacturers are 
excluding the intellectual property contributors from receiving their equitable rewards by 
engaging in extensive and expensive patent litigation, a process which he describes as ‘legal 
attrition’. Although James attributes this enclosure effect to the application of absolute 
property rights, he explains that it is an indirect rather than a direct effect which causes it. In 
simple terms, this indirect effect can be explained as follows. 
Given that most advanced technological products are now dependent on multiple intellectual 
property contributions from a multitude of intellectual property owners, when one of the 
contributors abuses their absolute rights to demand licensing fees far in excess of the value of 
their contribution, this obviously and inequitably deprives other contributors of the possibility 
of receiving a fair share for their contribution. This direct effect is referred to as a ‘patent 
hold-up’. When the courts are obligated to apply absolute property rights, one way of 
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avoiding the inequitable outcomes of ‘patent hold-up’ is to allow the defendants, who are 
usually multinational high-tech manufactures, to indulge in protracted litigation with the 
expectation that these protracted proceedings will encourage the plaintiff to be more 
reasonable. The problem is that once the courts allowed protracted litigation to combat 
‘patent hold-up’, they could not prevent the same manufacturers from using the same ‘legal 
attrition’ to reduce the licensing fees of intellectual property contributors who were not 
abusing their property rights, but merely offering to licence their intellectual properties near 
the value that they contributed to the technological product.145 
To the extent that James is concerned about ensuring that all intellectual property owners 
receive an equitable return for their work, he is clearly addressing similar social issues to 
those addressed by Polanyi and Commons. However, in contrast to Polanyi, he does not 
argue for the removal of the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labour, and money, or 
knowledge for that matter, from the market,146 or for an increase of government intervention, 
which may lead to an excess of ‘planning, regulation and control’.147 Instead, James suggests 
a solution in line with the ‘common-law method’ specified by Commons:148 the application 
of an alternative property rights doctrine, called the ‘correlative rights doctrine’. In essence, 
that doctrine states that: When multiple parties have individual property claims on an 
inherently integrated property each is legally entitled to their proportional share of the value 
of that property and the law should protect that share from being appropriated by others, 
including other owners.149 While the doctrine itself is relatively unknown in mainstream 
property law, it has in fact been applied in water law and oil and gas law for over 100 
years.150 
James’s argument for the application of correlated rights in intellectual property relies on the 
same arguments which were used to establish the correlative rights doctrine in these two 
bodies of law. More specifically, this means that when individual property owners have 
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individual property claims on what is a common asset, the courts have duty to ensure that 
each individual owner is able to secure no more, or less, than their proportional share of the 
aggregate value available or created. James further argues that once the threat of patent hold-
up is eliminated, this will also eliminate the courts’ justification for allowing ‘legal attrition’, 
and as such they will be required to take a more proactive response to frivolous litigation.151 
As opposed to the absolute property rights doctrine, which was based on the ‘negative’ 
relation between a (solid) thing and a person, the correlative property rights doctrine puts the 
‘positive’ relations between different persons centre-stage, each of which has rights in the 
same (fugitive) thing. Given this more equitable approach to property ownership there is 
good reason to claim that this concept of property better meets the requirements of the 
information age. In the last chapter of his thesis,152 James speculates on whether or not the 
correlative rights doctrine has to be confined to just similar contributions to an integrated 
asset. The question he asks is whether it can also be used to resolve disputes between 
dissimilar contributions to an integrated asset. For example: can it be used to resolve disputes 
between workers and their employers, when the dispute revolves around the workers’ 
contributions to the product which they produce? Regardless of whether or not the correlated 
rights doctrine can be used in cases involving dissimilar contributions, given the ubiquitous 
nature of high-tech products and the multinational nature of their manufacturers, if it is only 
applied in correlated intellectual property law, it would certainly have both domestic and 
international legal implications. 
In summary, what James is arguing is that while the globalized market society may rest on 
private property rights, the absolute quality of these rights should be contested by both 
legislators and the courts whenever their application creates inequitable results. Against this 
backdrop, it is entirely possible that correlative property rights will become the defining 
feature of a future intellectual property regime which leaves universal property rights intact, 
but also respects their ‘embeddedness’. 
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CONCLUSION: TAKING PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THE FUTURE 
Taking a Polanyian approach to international economic law, which cross-cuts conventional 
distinctions between national and international, public and private law, the aim of this chapter 
was to explore the configuration of property relations in the market society. In order to 
understand the specificities of this regime, the development of property rights was put in a 
long-term historical perspective, identifying phases of common property, concentrated 
property, and universal property. The functioning of the market society, which rests, to a 
large part, on commodity exchange, including the fictitious commodities of land, labour, and 
money, is premised on the ‘universalization’ of property rights. This universalization can be 
understood not only in the way that nowadays everybody can be an owner and that almost 
anything can be owned and eventually traded, but also in the way that the rationale, or 
science, behind this property regime is of a universalistic nature. In practice, the global 
diffusion of neoclassical or neo-institutional concepts of property goes hand in hand with the 
transnationalization of the economic profession.153 
However, the property law of market society is not static; instead, it has experienced 
considerable variation within the basic universalist framework. The universal property stage 
could thus be divided into a stage of free, or ‘self-regulating’, markets and a subsequent stage 
of more regulated markets, with the respective degrees of commodification and de-
commodification changing over time. As we have seen, the universalization of ownership 
was linked to the rise of the merchant class, or the emergence of commercial capitalism. In a 
market society, which relies on commodity exchange as allocation mechanism for almost 
anything, trade obviously has a central function. At the same time, the (relative) economic 
weight of different sectors of production – agriculture, industry, and services – has 
significantly changed over the last two centuries. This is reflected in adaptations of the 
institution of property in terms of its main subjects, its main objects, and its core conditions. 
Agricultural capitalism was premised on the enclosure of land, with big landholdings 
furthering economic progress while depriving rural people of their livelihoods. With the 
Industrial Revolution, the focus changed from land to capital as the key property, and from 
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individual to corporate owners as the key actors driving capitalist development. The 
propertyless had to turn to wage labour in the new factories to make a living, often under 
highly exploitative conditions. Today’s informational capitalism is marked by an emphasis 
on intellectual property, or the commodification of knowledge. With the proliferation of 
inherently integrated properties with multiple interdependent owners, the old property rights 
absolutism becomes dysfunctional, and may easily lead to the abuse of economic power, as 
the example of patent hold-ups demonstrates. Imbalances of economic power show in the 
relation between multinational corporations, which can afford to disregard certain patents and 
wait for courts to decide, and small-scale software engineers, whose economic survival 
depends on their ‘fractional’ property rights being observed and royalties being paid in time. 
What the concept of correlative property rights illustrates is that there is a middle ground 
between leaving absolute property rights intact and abolishing private property altogether. In 
this sense, the alternative of capitalist and socialist models of ownership, which was at stake 
at the time of Polanyi’s writing,154 and which is still invoked in economic textbooks of 
today,155 leaves out the possibility of further developing the relational quality of property 
rights: within the universal property paradigm but under the premise of correlated rights. 
While our focus was on the historical development of property rights, and not on the different 
geographical layers of property law, our study does have implications for national and 
international property law alike. This is already clear from the fact that the enclosure 
movements regarding land and knowledge were and are not confined to national territories 
but ultimately global in their ambit. More generally, the globalization of the market society, 
which implies the universalization of property rights (not only as available for all but as 
enforceable everywhere), rests on international economic law, which we here understand in 
functional terms, including aspects of public and private law, within, between, and beyond 
‘sovereign’ states.156 It may not surprise that intellectual property, as least wedded to the soil 
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or most fluid in character,157 is at the forefront of this development and today ‘the most 
prominent category of international property law’.158 International investment law may, at 
first, seem more traditional in that its notion of property – or investment – basically refers to 
‘land and other immovable assets’.159 But it is revolutionary, from a Westphalian perspective, 
in that it is no longer about sovereigns handing down property to (dependent) subjects, but 
about private actors confronting sovereign states with ownership claims as (independent) 
subjects of the international legal order. When property thus trumps sovereignty, it is time to 
take a relational approach – to both. 
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